Distributed security storage model for large-scale data


Ming Zhang - School of Information Engineering, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Wei Chen - School of Information Engineering, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Yunpeng Cao - School of Information Science and Engineering, Linyi University, Linyi 276000, China


With the development of large-scale data, the increasingly users need to store the data in the distributed storage system due to the fact that the signal computer can not hold the massive data. However, the users can not control the data access rules. So the transparent security management of Large-scale data in distributed networks is a challenge. To solve this issue, a distributed security storage model is proposed. This security storage model can deal with the high concurrency and the complexity of large-scale data management in the distributed environment. The detailed designed of the transparent security storage system is provided based on the security storage model. This system allows the users manage their data and provides confidentiality protection, integrity protection, and access permission control. Experiments exhibit that the distributed storage model can improve the data security with I/O performance loss less than 5%.


Distributed storage system, transparent encryption, confidentiality, integrity control model.


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